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Depositor-preference laws provide depositors with a claim on a failed 
depository institution's assets that is senior to unsecured general creditor 
claims.  Therefore, depositor preference is correctly viewed as changing the 
capital structure of banks and thrifts and, consequently, these laws will affect 
the cost of capital for depositories.  However, depositor preference will not 
have an impact on the total value of  banks and thrifts unless deposit insurance 
is mispriced. I. Introduction 
It is generally accepted that the subsidy inherent in the current deposit insurance 
system creates perverse incentives for risk-taking by  insured depository institutions (Kane 
119851). The thrift debacle and its attendant financial and political costs have increasingly 
focused attention on the dangerous combination of  virtually unlimited federal deposit 
guarantees and regulatory discretion. 
Federal deposit guarantees, the too-big-to-let-fail (TBTLF) doctrine, and capital 
forbearance programs have effectively limited the ability of  markets to discipline troubled 
depository institutions.  On the other hand, principal-agent conflicts have often resulted in 
government regulatory policies designed to forestall disciplinary actions against troubled 
banks and thrifts (Kane 119891; Thomson 119921). 
Armed with an increased awareness of  the role that regulatory forbearance played in 
the thrift debacle and in the record losses in bank closings in the 1980s, Congress passed the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of  199 1  .'  FDICIA 
contains four important reforms:  First,  it requires the implementation of  prompt corrective 
action for undercapitalized banks and for banks designated to be problem institutions by  their 
primary federal regulator.  Carnell (1992) notes that FDICIA does not remove regulatory 
discretion but rather increasingly limits discretion as an institution slides towards insolvency. 
Second, FDICIA places limits on Federal Reserve discount window loans to troubled 
depositories.  Todd (1993) argues that FDICIA7s  discount window provisions are designed to 
prevent the Federal Reserve from propping up insolvent banks through improper solvency- 
based loans. Third, FDICIA now requires the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
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replaces the TBTLF doctrine with the systemic-risk exception which codifies the terms and 
conditions under which the FDIC can bail out uninsured claimants of  failed depositories. 
Carnell (1992) contends that provisions in FDICIA which require the written authorization of 
the Federal Reserve chairman and the secretary of  the Treasury for financing systemic-risk 
losses by  a special assessment on the total liabilities (total deposits) of  banks will limit the 
abuse of  the systemic-risk exception. 
Though FDICIA's  provisions are either already in  place or in the process of  being 
implemented, Congress added another potentially important reform designed to limit the 
FDIC's,  and hence the taxpayer's,  exposure.  Specifically, in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of  1993, Congress created a national depositor-preference law.2  Depositor- 
preference laws change the priority of depositors'  (and thus the FDIC's) claims on  the assets 
of  failed banks by  making other senior claimants subordinate to depositors.  In  other words, 
Congress implemented depositor preference in an effort to reduce FDIC losses by  changing 
the capital structure of  banks. 
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the impact of  depositor-preference laws 
on  the cost of  debt capital for banks and on the value of FDIC deposit  guarantee^.^  We 
extend the single-period cash-flow version of  the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
presented by  Chen (1978) and modified by Osterberg and Thomson (1990, 1991), to include 
depositor preference.  In Section 11,  we present the model.  Section III shows the results of a 
single-period analysis of  a bank  that has both uninsured and insured deposits and subordinated 
debt, as derived in Osterberg and Thomson (1991).  Section  IV extends the analysis of 
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Section IV we investigate the effects of mispriced deposit insurance and of depositor- 
preference laws on the value of  debt capital and on the value of deposit insurance. 
Conclusions and policy implications are presented in Section V. 
11.  The Model 
To examine the effects of depositor preference on the cost of  debt and equity capital 
for banks, we utilize the single-period CAPM valuation equation employed by  Chen (1978) 
and by Osterberg and Thomson (1990, 1991).  In this model, the value of a firm is the 
present value of  its future cash flows.  The value of the debt and equity of a firm are in turn 
the present value of  these claims on the firm's cash flows.  Certain cash flows are discounted 
at the risk-free rate of  interest.  Uncertain cash flows are converted to certainty-equivalent 
cash flows by deducting a risk premium from the expected cash flow.  From the CAPM the 
risk premium is simply the market price of risk, multiplied by  the covariance of  the uncertain 
cash flow with the market portfolio. 
Our primary assumptions are 1) the risk-free rate of interest is constant, 2) capital 
markets are perfectly competitive, 3) expectations are homogeneous with respect to the 
probability distributions of  the yields on risky assets, 4) investors are risk averse, seeking to 
maximize the utility of terminal wealth, and 5) there are no taxes or bankruptcy costs. 
In Sections 111 through V we utilize the following definitions: 
Bi = Total promised payment to insured depositors. 
B, = Total promised payment to uninsured depositors. 
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z  = Total promised payment to the FDIC (p~~).~ 
B = Total promised payment to depositors and the FDIC (Bi+BU+z). 
p = Deposit insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits. 
S  = Total promised payment to subordinated debtholders. 
D = Total promised payment in the absence of depositor preference laws (B,+B,i~G+S+z). 
K = Total promised payment with depositor preference laws (B,+B,+G+S+z). 
Y,,,  Y,,,  Y,,  Y,,  Ye, and Y,,  = End-of-period cash flows to insured depositors, uninsured 
depositors,  general creditors, subordinated debtholders, stockholders, and the FDIC, 
respectively. 
Vbi,  Vbu,  VG, V,,  Ve, and V,,  = Values of insured deposits, uninsured deposits, general 
creditors, subordinated debt, bank equity, and the FDIC claim, respectively. 
V,  = Value of  the bank. 
E(Rbi),  E(R,,),  E(&),  E(K), and E(R2 = The expected rates of return on insured and 
uninsured deposits, general creditors, subordinated debt, and equity, respectively. 
r = The risk-free rate (R = 1 + r). 
X = The end-of-period gross return on bank assets. 
F(X) = Cumulative probability distribution function for X. 
h = The market risk premium. 
COV(X,R,,,)  = Systematic or nondiversifiable risk. 
CEQ(X) = Certainty-equivalent of X [=Em) -  hCOV(X,k)]. 
R,,, = Return on the market portfolio. 
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to all depositors and subordinated debtholders includes both principal and interest.  In 
addition, we assume that the deposit insurance premium is paid at the end of the peri~d.~ 
111.  Banks' Cost of Capital and the Value of Deposit Insurance: No Depositor 
Preference 
In this section we present results from Osterberg and Thomson (1991) for a bank with 
insured deposits, uninsured deposits, and subordinated debt. The FDIC charges a fixed 
insurance premium of  p on each dollar of insured deposits.  The total liability claims against 
the bank, D, is the sum of  the end-of-period promised payments to the uninsured depositors, 
B,,  insured depositors, B,, general creditors, G, subordinated debtholders, S, and the FDIC, 
z  (pB,).  We assume that the FDIC underprices its deposit guarantees on average, and that in 
the absence of regulatory taxes (Buser, Chen, and Kane [1981]), the FDIC provides a subsidy 
that reduces the cost of  capital for banks and increases their value. 
Given these assumptions, it is clear that the end-of-period cash flows to the insured 
depositors, Y,, equal the promised payments to insured depositors, B,, in every state. 
Therefore, regardless of  a bank's capital structure, the value, expected return, and cost of  one 
dollar of insured deposits are defined as Vbi = R-'B,, E(R,,)  = r, and r + p, respectively. 
Uninsured Depositors 
The end-of-period cash flows to the uninsured depositors depend on the promised 
payment to the uninsured depositors and on the total level of promised payments net of the 
subordinated debt: 
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BuW(D -  S)  if  D-S>X>O 
0  if  O>X 
While the total promised payments to debtholders and the FDIC equal D, the effective 
bankruptcy threshold for uninsured depositors is D less the claims of the subordinated 
debtholders. The value of  and the required rate of return on uninsured deposits are 
D-S 
1 -F(D -8  +[l/(D-S)IE  (X) 
0  E(R,,)  = R  - 1.0.  D-S 
1 -F(D -S)  +[1/(D-91  CEQ  (X) 
0 
Equation (2) shows that the cost of debt (uninsured deposit) capital is a function of the bank's 
systematic risk, as measured by  kCOV(X, &),  total promised payments to depositors and the 
FDIC, (D-S),  the probability that losses will exceed the level of subordinated debt, F(D-S), 
and the risk-free rate of return.  Osterberg and Thomson (1990, 1991) show that when the 
FDIC misprices its guarantees, the cost of  uninsured deposit capital also depends on the 
deposit mix, because underpriced (overpriced) deposit guarantees lower (raise) both the 
effective bankruptcy threshold for senior claims, F(D-S),  and the bankruptcy threshold, F(D). 
Furthermore, underpriced (overpriced) deposit guarantees increase (decrease) the claims of  the 
uninsured depositors relative to senior claims, B  J(D-S),  and relative to total claims, BJD. 
The size of this effect is a function of the FDIC's pricing error per dollar of insured deposits 
and of the weight of  insured deposits in the senior creditor pool. 
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General creditors have the same priority of claim as uninsured depositors; 
consequently, they will have similar end-of-period cash flows. 
As before, the total promised payments equal D and  the effective bankruptcy threshold is 
D-S.  The value of and the required rate of return on senior nondeposit debt is: 
D -S 
l-F(D-S)+[lI(D-S)IE  (X) 
E(RJ  = R  - 1.0. 
D-S  (4) 
Equation (4) shows that the cost of  nondeposit debt (general credit) capital is a function of 
the same factors as uninsured deposits, including:  the bank's  systematic risk, hCOV(X,R,J, 
total promised payments to senior creditors and the FDIC, (D-S),  the probability that losses 
will exceed the level of  subordinated debt, F(D-S), and the risk-free rate of return.  In 
addition, it will also depend on the size of the deposit-insurance subsidy. 
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The end-of-period expected cash flows accruing to the subordinated debtholders are 
Y,= S  if  X>D 
X+S-D  if  D>X>D-S 
0  if  D-S>X. 
The value of the subordinated debt and the required rate of return on subordinated debt 
capital are 
D 
Vs  = R -l{~[l  -F(D-S)] -D[F(D)  -F(D-S)] +CEQ  (X)  }, 
D-S 
D 
S[1  -F(D -S)]  -D[F(D)  -F(D -S)] +E  (X) 
E(Rs)  = R 
D -S 
D  - 1.0.  (6) 
S[1  -F(D -591 -K[F(D)  -F(D -S)]  +CEQ  (X) 
D -S 
Equations (5) and (6) show that the cost and value of  subordinated debt capital depend on the 
probability of  bankruptcy, F(D), the face value of the subordinated debt, S, total promised 
payments, D, and the probability that senior claimants will not be  repaid in full, F(D-S). 
Note that the last two terms in  equation (6) represent the claims of  subordinated debtholders 
in states where they are the residual claimants. 
Equitvholders 
The end-of-period cash flows accruing to stockholders are 
Ye= X-D  if  X>D 
0  if  D > X. 
The value of  equity and the expected return to stockholders are 
8 
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The net value of deposit insurance is simply the value of the FDIC's  claim on the 
bank.  In the absence of depositor-preference laws, the end-of-period  cash flows to the FDIC 
and the value of its position are 
YFDIC  = Z  if  X>D-S 
(B,+z)X/(D-S) -  Bi  if  D-S>X>O 
-Bi  if  0 > X, and 
D-S 
v,,  = R-~{ZV-F(D-~  + ~CEQ  0  (x) - BF(D-S)I. 
Equation (9) shows that the net value of deposit insurance is a function of the 
composition of the senior claims, the bank's  systematic risk, the presence of junior debt 
claims in the bank's  capital structure, the risk-free rate of return, the effective probability of 
bankruptcy, F(D-S),  the level of promised payments to insured depositors, and the deposit 
insurance premium.  In fact, equation (9) can be interpreted as showing that the equity-like 
buffer provided by subordinated debt affects the value of the FDIC's  position by changing the 
probability that the put options corresponding to the FDIC guarantee will be "in the money" 
at the end of the period.  Equation (9) also makes clear that if deposit insurance is to be 
priced fairly,V,,,  = 0, the premium will be influenced by the degree to which the bank funds 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmitself with claims junior to insured deposits. 
Osterberg and Thomson (1990) show that the value of  the uninsured bank is 
R"CEQ,(X).  The value of the insured bank, V,,  equals the value of the uninsured bank minus 
equation (9), which is the value of the FDIC's  claim. 
D  -S 
V, = R  CEQ,(X) +  B~F(D  -8  -z[l-  F(D -81 -[(Bi  +z)/(D  -mCEQ  (x)  1. 
0 
(10) 
Equation (10) shows that the structure of a bank's  debt (in terms of priority of payment) 
affects the value of  the bank only through the net value of deposit insurance to the bank (the 
last three terms on the right side of equation [lo]).  Thus, if deposit insurance is always 
correctly priced (that is, its net value to the bank is zero), the structure of a bank's  liability 
claims has no impact on bank value. 
IV.  Banks'  Cost of Capital and the Value of the Insurance Fund:  Depositor Preference 
In this section we rederive the results when depositor-preference  laws are in existence. 
The effect of  depositor-preference  laws is to make the claims of  general creditors subordinate 
to those of  uninsured depositors and of the FDIC. As in  Section III, we assume that the FDIC 
charges a flat-rate insurance premium of  p on each dollar of  insured deposits and that on 
average the FDIC underprices its deposit guarantees.  The total liability claims against the 
bank, K, is the sum of  the end-of-period promised payments to the uninsured depositors, B,, 
the insured depositors, Bi, general creditors, G, subordinated debtholders, S, and the FDIC, 
z (mi). 
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The end-of-period cash flows to the uninsured depositors depend on the promised 
payment to the uninsured depositors and on the total level of promised payments net of  the 
subordinated debt and claims of  subordinated creditors: 
Ybu =  Bu  if  X>B=Bi+Bu+z 
BuX/B  if  B>X>O 
0  if  O>X 
While the total promised payments to debtholders and the FDIC equal K, the effective 
bankruptcy threshold for uninsured depositors is B  (= K-G-S).  The value of and the 
required rate of return on uninsured deposits are 
B 
Vbu =  R -'{  Bu[l  -  F(B)]  +(B,,/B)CEQ  o (X)  1, 
From the standpoint of uninsured deposit capital, depositor-preference laws have the same 
impact as a requirement that banks issue subordinated debt.  That is, when uninsured 
depositors and the FDIC are given a claim in bankruptcy that is senior to that of general 
creditors, the effective bankruptcy threshold for uninsured depositors is lowered from D-S  to 
K-G-S.  For uninsured depositors (and, as we shall, see for the FDIC), the pecking order of 
junior claims beneath them is irrelevant in valuing their claims. 
To find the impact of depositor preference on the value of uninsured deposits, we 
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flows by  the level of uninsured deposits, and compare uninsured deposits in banks in the 
presence and absence of depositor-preference laws.  We then separate the expected cash flow 
to an uninsured deposit (with a par value of one dollar) in the presence of depositor- 
preference debt into two instruments:  one that is identical to the uninsured deposit in 
Section III, and a second that has the following end-of-period payoffs and value: 
AY,,  = 0  if  X>D-S 
1 -  X/(D-S)  if  D-S  > X > B 
X/B -  XI@-S)  if  B>X>O 
0  if  O>X 
Equation (13) is positive; to see this, note that the first term in the brackets is strictly greater 
than  the third term.  Moreover, since by definition D -  S > B, the middle term is also 
positive. Therefore, depositor preference must increase the value of  a dollar of  insured 
deposits. 
General Creditors 
Under depositor preference, general creditors have a claim that is junior to depositors 
and to the FDIC but senior to subordinated creditors; hence, end-of-period cash flows to 
general creditors are 
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X-B  if  K-S>X>B 
0  if  B>X 
The total promised payments to debtholders and to the FDIC equal K, and the effective 
bankruptcy threshold is K -  S.  The value of  and the required rate of  return on general 
creditor claims are 
K-S 
VG = R-'{~[l-F(K-S)]-B[F(K-S)-F(B)]+CEQ  (X)}, 
B 
K-S 
G[1-  F(K-S)]  -B[F(K-S) -  F(B)]  +E  (X) 
E(RG) =  R 
B 
K-S  - 1.0. 
G[l  -  F(K-S)]  -B[F(K-S)  -F(B)]  +CEQ  (X) 
B 
Equations (14) and (15) show that nondeposit debt (general credit) behaves like subordinated 
debt (equations [5] and [6]), except that general creditors are afforded protection from loss by 
the presence of  subordinated debt.  The value of  general creditors' claims depends on the 
effective bankruptcy threshold, F(K-S),  the face value of  their claims, G, total promised 
payments to senior claimants, B, and the probability that senior claimants will not be repaid  ' 
in full, F(B).  Note that when earnings fall between B and K-S,  general creditors are the 
residual claimants, and their claim will behave like an equity claim. 
Following the procedure used in the previous subsection, we construct the replicating 
portfolio for a general-creditor claim (with a par value of  one dollar) under depositor 
preference.  The impact of  depositor preference on the value of  general-creditor claims 
depends on whether K > D, or D > K.  We assume that K 2  D.  Let Ve(X I D) and Ve(X I .K) 
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Ve(X I D) < Ve(X I  K), and stockholders could increase the value of their claim by voluntarily 
issuing general-creditor claims that are subordinate to deposits.  Hence, K must be greater 
than D and, by  implication, K-S  > D-S.  The expected cash flow to a general-creditor claim 
(with a par value of one dollar) in the presence of depositor preference is divided into one 
claim that is identical to the general 'creditor claim in Section 111,  and a second that -has the 
following end-of-period payoffs and value: 
BYG =  0  if  X>K-S 
(X-B)/G  - 1  if  K-S  > X > D-S 
(X-B)/G  -  X/(D-S)  if  D-S  > X > B 
-X/(D-S  )  if  B>X>O 
0  if  0 > X, 
K-S 
A V,  = R-'{ -[F(K-S) -F(D-S)] - $[F(K-S) -F(B)]  +  -$EQ  B  (X) 
D -S  (16) 
- ~CEQ  D -S  o  (x)} < 0. 
Equation (16) is clearly negative.  The first and last terms inside the braces on the right- hand 
side of the equation are both negative, since K > D.  In addition, the second term is negative 
and larger in absolute value than the third.  Hence, AVG is unambiguously negative, and 
depositor preference decreases the value of a general-creditor claim (with a par value of one 
dollar). 
Subordinated Debt 
Under depositor preference, the end-of-period  expected cash flows accruing to the 
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Y,  =  S  if  X>K 
X+S-K  if  K>X>K-S 
0  if  K-S>X. 
The value of the subordinated debt and the required rate of return on subordinated debt 
capital are simply equations (5) and (6), modified to reflect that K is the total promised 
payment instead of  D. 
K 
V'  = R-YS[l -F(K-S)] -  mF(K)-F(K-S)]  + CEQ  (X)}, 
K-S 
K 
S[l-F(K-S)I-mF(K)-F(K-S)]+E  (X) 
E(Rs)  = R 
K-S  - 1.0. 
K  (18) 
s[1 -F(K-S)I -aF(K)  -F(K-S)] +CEQ  K-s  (X) 
Total promised payments under depositor preference, K, may not equal total promised 
payments in the absence of depositor preference, D, because depositor preference changes the 
risk faced by depositors, the FDIC, and general creditors.  Therefore, while subordinated debt 
is not directly affected by depositor-preference laws, it is indirectly affected through changes 
in the level of  promised payments and the probability of  bankruptcy. 
Assuming K 2 D, the differences between the cash flows accruing to a one-dollar par- 
value claim of subordinated debt, in the absence of and with depositor preference, he 
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(D-K)/S  if  D > X > K-S 
(D-X)/S  - 1  if  K-S  > X > D-S 
K  K-S 
A Vs =  (RS)-'{CEQ  (X) - CEQ  (X) - S[F(K-S)  -F(D-S)] 
D  D-S  (19) 
Given K 2  D, equation (19) is nonpositive because the net cash flows for all possible ranges 
of X in AV,  are nonpositive.  Therefore, if depositor preference increases the total promised 
payments by the bank, the value of a one-dollar-par-value  claim of  subordinated debtholders 
will be reduced through the impact of depositor preference on the bankruptcy threshold. 
Equityholders 
As with the subordinated debtholders, depositor preference influences the value of 
stockholder claims through its impact on the bankruptcy threshold, K.  Under depositor 
preference, the end-of-period cash flows accruing to stockholders are 
Ye=  X-K  if  X > K 
0  if  K > X. 
The value of  equity and the expected return to stockholders are 
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preference is simply the difference between equation (20) and equation (7). 
K 
A Ve =  R  D[F(K)  -  F(D)] +  (D  -K)[l  -F(a - CEQ (X)  }  s 0. 
D 
(22) 
As with subordinated debt, the value of equity is affected by depositor preference when 
K # D.  That is, when the imposition of depositor preference increases the level of  total 
promised payments (and by  implication the probability of bankruptcy), the value of  the bank's 
equity falls.  To see this, note that the first term inside the brackets is greater in absolute 
value than the second term. 
The FDIC's Claim 
As before, the net value of deposit insurance is simply the value of  the FDIC's claim 
on  the bank.  Under depositor preference, the end-of-period cash flows to the FDIC and the 
value of  its position are 
YFDIC  = Z  if  X>B 
(B,+z)X/B -  Bi  if  B>X>O 
-Bi  if  0 > X, and 
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from a subordinated-debt requirement.  Depositor preference affects the net value of  the 
FDIC's claim by  changing the senior claimants' probability of  loss and by  changing the 
weight of  the FDIC in the pool of  senior claims. 
The change in  the value of  the FDIC guarantee on a one-dollar-par-value deposit is the 
value of  the security which  has the following cash flows (where p = z/Bi): 
AY,,,=  0  if  X>D-S 
p -  (1 + p)X/(D -  S) + 1  if  D-S>X>B 
(l+p)X/B -  (l+p)X/(D -  S)  if  B>X>O  ' 
0  if  O>X 
Equation (24) is positive; to see this, note that the first term in  the brackets is strictly greater 
than the second term.  Since we  assume that the FDIC on  average underprices its guarantees, 
the FDIC claim on  the bank is negative; hence, the size of  the FDIC subsidy is smaller under 
depositor preference. 
Finally, the effect of  depositor preference on the value of  the bank is entirely through 
its effect on  the net value of  deposit insurance. 
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zero), depositor preference has no impact on bank value.  However, it does change the fair 
value of  deposit insurance and, hence, must be accounted for when setting the premium. 
V.  Conclusions 
Using the cash-flow version of  the CAPM, we show how depositor-preference laws 
affect the value and pricing of  stakeholder claims on  insured banks.  By effectively changing 
the capital structure of the bank, depositor-preference laws increase the value of uninsured 
deposit claims and reduce the size of the FDIC subsidy.  General creditors,.  subordinated 
debtholders, and equityholders all see the value of  their one-dollar-par claims reduced. 
The impact of  depositor-preference laws on the value of deposit insurance is the same 
as a mandatory subordinated-debt requirement.  In  each case, depositors and the FDIC are 
afforded an extra layer of  loss buffer by the existence of debt claims which are junior to their 
own.6 
The influence of  depositor preference on the required rates of  return for bank liabilities 
depends crucially on the extent' of deposit-insurance mispricing, as well as on the magnitude 
of the general-creditor claims.  Like subordinated debt, depositor-preference laws cannot 
reduce the deposit-insurance subsidy unless insurance is mispriced. 
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1.  DeGennaro and Thomson (1994) show that capital forbearance increased  the total taxpayer 
bill in the thrift debacle by more than 500 percent. 
2. Title I11 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1993 instituted depositor preference for 
all  insured  depository  institutions  by  amending  Section  ll(d)(ll) of  the  Federal  Deposit 
Insurance  Corporation  Act  [12  U.S.C.  1821(d)(l  l)].  At  the  time  when  national  depositor 
preference was enacted, 29 states had  similar laws covering state-chartered  banks, and  18 had 
depositor-preference statutes covering state-chartered thrift institutions. 
3. An empirical study of the impact of depositor-preference laws can be found in Hirschhom and 
Zervos (1  990). 
4.  For simplicity,  we express the premium  as a function of  insured  deposits.  The results  of 
interest would not be materially affected by adopting the more realistic assumption that premiums 
are levied on total domestic deposits, both insured and uninsured. 
5.  For simplicity, we assume that the deposit-insurance  premium is an end-of-period claim on 
the bank.  This is equivalent to assuming that the premium is subordinate to Bi and that, in effect, 
the bank receives coverage while not necessarily paying the full premium.  However, while this 
assumption does affect how the deposit-insurance subsidy enters into the expressions in this paper 
and the actual size of the subsidy, it does not qualitatively affect the results. 
6.  However, unlike a  mandatory  subordinated-debt requirement,  holders  of  general-creditor 
claims could conceivably restructure their claims by taking collateral, and thereby improve their 
position relative to depositors and the FDIC.  Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990) find that for thrifts 
in states with depositor-preference laws, general creditors are more likely to be collateralized; 
hence, in those states these laws afforded little protection to depositors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmReferences 
Buser, S. A., A.  H. Chen, and  E. J. Kane, 1981, Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory 
Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital, Journal of Finance 36, 51-60. 
Carnell, R.  S.,  1992, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act 
of  1991, Papers presented at the Conference on Rebuilding Public Confidence through 
Financial Reform, Ohio State University (June 25). 
Chen, A.  H.,  1978, Recent Developments in the Cost of  Debt Capital, Journal of Finance 33, 
863-877. 
DeGennaro, R. P., and J. B. Thomson,  1994, Capital Forbearance and Thrifts: An  Ex  Post 
Examination of  Regulatory Gambling, Journal of Financial Services Research 8 
(forthcoming). 
Hirschhorn, E.,  and D.  Zervos,  1990, Policies to  Change the Priority of  Claimants: The Case 
of  Depositor Preference Laws, Journal of Financial Services Research 4,  1  1  1  - 126. 
Kane, E. J.,  1985, The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance, (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press). 
Kane, E.J.,  1989, The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did It Happen? (Washington, DC: The 
Urban Institute). 
Osterberg, W.  P.,  and J. B. Thomson,  1990, Deposit Insurance and the Cost of  Capital, in 
Research in Finance 8, ed. A.  H. Chen (Greenwich, CN:  JAI Press Inc.), 255-270. 
Osterberg, W. P.,  and J.  B. Thomson, 1991, The Effect of  Subordinated Debt and Surety 
Bonds on the Cost of Capital for Banks and on the Value of  Federal Deposit Insurance, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 15 (September), 939-953. 
Thomson, J. B.,  1987, The Use of  Market Information in Pricing Deposit Insurance, Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking  19, 528-532. 
Thomson, J. B.,  1992, A Market-Based Approach to Reforming Bank Regulation and Federal 
Deposit Insurance, in Research in Financial Services: Private and Public Policy 4, ed. G. 
Kaufman (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press Inc.), 93-109. 
Todd, W.  F., '1993, Discount Window Provisions of  the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of  199  1, Banking Policy Report (March  1). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm